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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM
Richard A Epstein*
I. FOR THE LONG HAUL
The title of this talk contains an ostensible ambiguity. One
reading of "Affirmative Action for the Next Millennium" hints
that I shall propose some instant fix for the year 2000 or 2001,
* The James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago. B.A., Columbia College; B.A. (Juris.), Oxford University; LL.B., Yale Law
School. L. Rex Sears provided his usual careful research assistance in preparing the re-
visions of this speech.
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depending on when you think we cross over to the next millen-
nium. But alas, since my views have not controlled public opin-
ion, we are not likely to reach, by that early date, the consensus
that has eluded the American people for at least two genera-
tions. Therefore, my title, with its choice of the word "millen-
nium," suggests a different take on the problem. When I talk
about affirmative action for the next "millennium," I mean to
imply that the struggles will continue unabated for the next
thousand years. I choose that reading because I do not think we
shall all agree on a solution that magically satisfies the diverse
interests that have clashed over this topic. In one sense, our
long term "solution" is a series of unhappy short term
accommodations.
Now, for me to live up to the title of this talk, I should ex-
plain to you exactly how that pattern of future controversy will
unfold, what players will emerge, what arguments they will
make, and what novel developments will arise in response to ei-
ther political events or technological changes. Yet whenever peo-
ple talk about the future of any given field, they really mean to
tell you something about its past. They hope to trace the course
of evolution to our present impasse and predicament; only then
do they offer some modest proposals for improvements from the
lessons they have gleaned from our history. I have no Polyan-
nish solutions, but I endorse and follow this approach: we can
get a better sense of ourselves by recapping the salient history.
In this essay I shall confine my attention to issues of race, al-
though the civil rights revolution encompasses far more.
II. A COLOR-BLIND WORLD
Affirmative action, both as a concept and as a problem, was
born in the national debate over The Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Its key provisions introduce a very strong color-, sex-, race-,
age-, and everything-blind conception of the statutory regime.
Thus, its central command reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
[Vol. 43504
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origin.... I
Whatever your approach to statutory construction may be, you
discover, much to your pleasure or sorrow, that in this instance
the intention of Congress, the evils that it sought to correct, and
the text that it devised to correct them all spoke and resonated
with a single voice. Close reading and detailed research reveal
no deep moral ambiguity on a statutory purpose. The drafters
said what they meant and meant what they said. They sought
to combat the system of explicit racial preferences enshrined
under Jim Crow in the South. The drafters were prepared, per-
haps with some naive optimism, to stop this evil by simply
prohibiting it under a new legal regime that reached both pri-
vate and government action. So they announced a system that
made the law, to use John Harlan's old phrase, "color-blind,"
that is color-blind over matters on the rights and duties of all
individuals. 2 Indeed, and the issue is not one of little impor-
tance, the statute took the color-blind theme one step further
than at first Justice Harlan would take it. His protest was
against the explicit racial classifications embedded in Louisiana
law. The drafters of the 1964 Act went one step further. For
them it was not sufficient to keep the apparatus of the state
color-blind. It was necessary to make employers color-blind as
well. They thought they could have the best of both worlds.
They could introduce an explicit government command that
would help keep irrational economic behavior out of professional
and commercial life, both public and private.
The venture was bold in its own terms, and one could easily
doubt transition from the older regime to the new. Could we
keep to the same color-blind system as we try to engineer the
changeover from a long-standing repressive regime, or would we
have to bend a bit at the margins to ensure a color-blind system
in steady-state? Back in 1964, people gave some answers that
sound quaint and archaic today. These deserve at least a mo-
mentary recapitulation.
The first response was that any disparities in employment
opportunities attributable only to broad social forces could not
be laid at the doorstep of the employer, and thus lay outside the
scope of the anti-discrimination law. So if black job candidates
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19981 505
HeinOnline  -- 43 Loy. L. Rev. 505 1997-1998
Loyola Law Review
came from a bad educational system and white job candidates
came from a strong one - too bad - the employer could pass
over the weak candidates and hire only the stronger white can-
didates for the plum positions without running afoul of the law.
Equality of opportunity was not equality of results. The former
could come immediately in the workplace; the latter would have
to await for the reform of the educational system, a task to be
solved by other means.
Nor should this narrow focus come as a surprise. Looking at
the statute in light of what has happened through 1998 gives a
very different perspective from looking at it in light of what had
happened in the ten years before its passage - the period that
started with Brown v. Board of Education,3 with its emphasis on
de jure segregation. The progressive forces could not have
pushed through any statute that embodied the broad ambition
to poke and probe into every area of American life. The past was
a much more powerful constraint in 1964, but all of those con-
straints disappeared by 1972 when Congress passed the first
round of amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act after the old-
guard Southerners had disappeared from the scene. Yet at least
in the initial round, legislation came through compromise, not
with full-throated, unanimous agreement on major overhauls of
the private sector. The concerns about unconscious racism lay in
the future. The 1964 Congress had its hands filled with the con-
scious forms.
The transition also had to address how best to apply color-
blind law to institutions with built-in racial prejudices. Here,
the 1964 drafters took a position that was both more sensible
and more subtle than it receives credit. When Senator
Humphrey was pressed about how a color-blind standard ap-
plied to a discriminatory world, his basic reply was simple: if ra-
cial discrimination is more frequent against blacks than whites,
then blacks will more frequently invoke the statute than whites.
The standard is neutral; its application is neutral. But its fre-
quency of use depends on what is done in the world, not on
what is said in the halls of Congress. So Humphrey did not
think that the law had to build any particular preference into
the rules to respond to the skewed social and racial attitudes
that survived passage of the statute. He felt that" neutral princi-
3, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ples, consistently enforced, would yield disparate enforcement
patterns when they were called for, and only when they were
called for. He could offer no guarantees about the future, but
had no need to offer them. If the distribution and frequency of
illicit preferences changed over time, reversing the racial mix
ratio of offenders and victims, then the targets of legal action
could change with them: more white plaintiffs would be success-
ful than he imagined. The result was one that he welcomed, not
feared.
The first and second points together indicate a form of
gradualism. Better social institutions remove the barriers to
equal opportunity, and consistent enforcement practices root out
lingering prejudices. Over the long haul the past recedes and
the new environment comes to dominate. The original Civil
Rights Act relies on the long-term effects of legal symmetry to
eradicate the differential status that social groups occupied at
the time of its passage. Taken together, these precepts define
the behavior that constitutes both violation of, and conformity
with, the main command of Title VII.4 It is not only possible,
but also imperative, to distinguish between preferential treat-
ment or affirmative action on the one hand, and the anti-dis-
crimination principle on the other. Any explicit or self-conscious
preference for or against any individual was prohibited; and if
individuals could not be favored because of their race, neither
could groups. The universal and neutral wording of the statute
was not any covert effort to smuggle affirmative action into the
law: the transgressions of government were as clearly demar-
cated, in the same coin, as those of private parties. In its ex-
panded domain of public and private life, the color-blind norm
was king.
II. LURCHING TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
This strong version of the law eroded with time under the
pressure of judicial interpretation. Within a decade, it became
much more difficult to distinguish between the neutral enforce-
ment of the color-blind norm and affirmative action. The univer-
sal anti-discrimination norm was transformed from within, with-
out clear acknowledgment of the change. Whether the
transformation took place by inadvertence, eagerness, or guile, I
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) - (eX17) (1997).
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leave for others to decide. The fact of the change is indisputable.
The impulse for that change in legal outlook lay in broader so-
cial attitudes. With the passage of the 1964 Act, the initial pub-
lic optimism waned, and people quickly sensed that the gradual
interventions contemplated under the 1964 Act could not move
fast enough nor decisively enough to respond to the social un-
rest of Newark, Detroit, New York, and Los Angeles. Color-
blindness became less an aspiration and more a code word for
the maintenance of the status quo.
IV. PROTECTED CLASSES
That socia disillusionment cashed out in the judicial arena.
One question that set the stage for the change asked, "just who
is protected by the 1964 Civil Rights Act?" The universal view
in 1964 traced its origins to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but
that attitude did not last going forward. No longer did every in-
dividual enjoy equal protected status. The protected classes in-
cluded chiefly blacks and other minorities, and perhaps women,
although the issues of course were different with race and sex.
"Gender" still lay a few years into the future. By the mid-1970s,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5 gave voice to a real change.
The neutral statute now was held to be designed for the benefit
of certain "protected classes." The typical discrimination claim
began first with the proposition that the plaintiff "belongs to a
racial minority," and only after that did a claim proceed to the
second issue of whether he was "qualified" for the job. If so, then
the inquiry asked whether the employer could advance some
justification for the practice. That done, the inquiry proceeded to
the fourth stage, to ask whether the proffered justification was
just a "pretext" for some forbidden motive. Pass over a member
of a protected class and hire someone else, and there is a pre-
sumption of illegality. Pass over someone who is not in the pro-
tected class and hire a minority, and there is no presumption of
illegal conduct.
In principle, that four-part test could work regardless of
who was aggrieved. Thus, if a qualified white person was passed
over for a job subsequently filled by a black applicant, the court
could then ask whether that decision was justified or pretextual,
just as with the black applicant. But once the notion of a pro-
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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tected class became salient, the statute came to incorporate the
very skew that Hubert Humphrey had disclaimed. So now the
definitional inquiry is more cloudy: does the use of protected
classes count as a form of affirmative action or just as a vigor-
ous enforcement of the anti-discrimination principle? Reasonable
people could easily disagree on the conceptual and definitional
question. But I think that the historical question is clear that
the very conception of a "protected class" contradicts the pro-
position that the protection of the Act extends to "any individ-
ual." There was no room under the original Act for a two-tier in-
terpretation. The broad and extensive Senate debates over the
1964 Act do not to my knowledge contain a single reference to
the idea that one race was a protected class. That conception
was not part of the legislative history; nor was it part of the
common vernacular in 1964.
V. COST JUSTIFICATIONS
In addition to the skirmish over protected classes, the sec-
ond key dispute in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act swirled
over the content of the justifications available to explain an ad-
verse outcome to a member of a protected class. The idea that
some reason could justify passing over the qualified black appli-
cant does not tell us what that reason should be. More con-
cretely, the key question is whether to allow "for cause" justifi-
cations for discrimination. To back off for a second and see what
is at stake, think less about the anti-discrimination laws as they
applied to race and more about the anti-discrimination laws as
they applied to the pricing of goods and services in the market.
For antitrust buffs, one point of reference is the Robinson-
Patman Act passed in the 1930s.6 Another is the requirement of
nondiscrimination in rate regulation. In these economic con-
texts, there is discrimination and there is discrimination. The
term bears two very distinct meanings, and it is imperative to
distinguish between them.
The first meaning is simply any difference in the prices
charged to different customers. You charge more to customer A
than to customer B. This price difference can be regarded, pure
and simple, as a form of price discrimination. But in the eco-
6. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592 §§ 2-4, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994)).
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nomic arena, you are also allowed to show that these price dis-
criminations are justified because it is more costly for you to
serve one class of customers than another. Looked at compre-
hensively, the right question is whether your rate of return for
the two distinct classes is the same. If it is, then you are not
discriminating; if the rates of return are different, then you are
discriminating. But throughout, the charge of price discrimina-
tion carries weight only if it is a form of discrimination not tied
to differences in cost.
The employment context raises exactly the same interpre-
tive question. Suppose an employer hires two groups of employ-
ees, one of which, for one reason or another, costs more money
for an employer to train or retain than the other group. Those
cost differentials reflect themselves in market wage differentials.
Thus, let one group cost two dollars more per hour to train or
retain than the other: in equilibrium the market wage for the
low cost group should be two dollars higher than it is for the
high cost group; a wage ten dollars for the first group implies a
wage of eight dollars for the second. The source of the wage dif-
ferential is not important: it could be, for example, the differen-
tials in educational skills that concerned the supporters of the
1964 Act. The wage differential will survive as long as the dif-
ferences in performance levels survive. Rational employers will
not abandon the differential, because they need to keep the net
return per worker constant across the two classes. The worker
with the lower level of productivity receives the lower wage.
The issue here is not tied in any necessary fashion to differ-
ences in race. And these wage differentials are, to this day, be-
yond legal challenge so long as that correlation does not corre-
late with race. But what happens if the observed behavior does
correlate with race? One stunning fact about the debates over
the 1964 Civil Rights Act is that their dread of preferential
treatment action led them to turn a blind eye to this fundamen-
tal question: are wage differences that are tied to cost differ-
ences justified under the 1964 Act? I am aware of no discussion
of the critical question of how cost justifications play out. Its
only after somebody actually makes this argument that someone
has to figure out whether or not to accept it. The first definition
of discrimination treats the point as a dead loser. The second re-
quires an extensiv e examination to see whether the purported
differences in productivity are feigned or real. Thus, in every
510 [Vol. 4
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case, the question of justification and pretext squarely raised in
McDonnell Douglas arises.
So the dilemma is complete. The first but inaccurate defini-
tion of discrimination is easy to administer, but leads to errone-
ous results. The second definition, however accurate in principle,
opens the door to potential justifications that employers could
use to gut the 1964 Act. It is therefore no surprise that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
courts opted for the first account of discrimination if only to pre-
serve the moral clarity of the basic statutory command. Yet that
decision created a chasm between the economic and legal ac-
counts of discrimination. Under the new regime the employer is
allowed to ask what benefit the worker supplies, but the other
blade has been taken from the scissors. He cannot ask whether
the collateral costs to train or retain the two workers are the
same. Identical titles and identical job descriptions require
equal wages for unequally productive workers. Now the rational
employer is engaged in illegal discrimination as part and parcel
of his routine business. The statute no longer hits only the big-
oted employer. It hits every employer.
On this view of the subject, the line between affirmative ac-
tion and the anti-discrimination norm is further blurred. If the
economic account of discrimination is correct, then the demand
of equal wages for workers with unequal costs requires an im-
plicit transfer of, in the example given, one dollar per hour from
high skilled to low skilled workers. Subsidies of course do not
have just distributional consequences. The law now gives the
employer a new incentive to steer away from low-skilled workers
because he can no longer extract the compensating wage differ-
ential. That transfer payment operates as a disguised subsidy
for one group of employees and a disguised penalty on the sec-
ond. Perhaps some fine distinction exists between these penalty/
subsidy pairs and affirmative action, but I confess that the cate-
gorical separation eludes me. Once cost must be ignored, a form
of covert affirmative action has been introduced into the basic
anti-discrimination norm. You may be for or against the out-
come, but you are hard-pressed to deny the magnitude of the
covert transformation.
1998] .511
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VI. DISPARATE IMPACT
The implicit transformation of the color-blind norm was
given another boost by the rise of disparate impact analysis dur-
ing the late sixties and early seventies. Even in an all white
population, an employer has strong incentives to know the rela-
tive strengths of a group of new workers. The investments in
these workers depend on the likelihood of their advancement,
which in turn depends on the skills and abilities they bring to
the job. Testing was the vehicle used to separate workers within
the larger class. In the debates over the 1964 Act, Senator
Humphrey, in retreat, introduced into the Act a specific provi-
sion to protect professionally developed ability tests from invali-
dation under the Act, so long as they were not designed, in-
tended, or used as a means to discriminate against any group.7
The word "used" in this formulation was included in parallel
with "designed" or "intended." It meant to cover the employer
that chose an available test with the hope that it would yield
disparate impact. But in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,8 the Su-
preme Court gave "used" a far broader reading: any test that
had a disparate impact by race was used for some illicit pur-
pose, and it could survive judicial challenge only by meeting a
stringent standard of business necessity.
The upshot was a persistent prohibition against information
that would allow employers to avoid the racial stereotypes that
the 1964 Act sought to combat in the workplace. No information
became, as a matter of law, preferable to imperfect information.
Because employers could no longer collect reliable information to
allow them to differentiate individual workers within groups,
they were given an additional reason to rely on crude racial
proxies to decide on matters of job assignment and promotion.
Yet once they sought to do that, they could expose themselves to
charges of intentional discrimination. In the end, therefore, the
restriction on testing was heavily enforced, which in turn inten-
sified the level of cross-subsidies required by the Act. The em-
ployer who thought in good faith that A was a better worker
than B could not rely on that judgment even if it was correct.
The rise of disparate impact tests under Griggs9 prevented the
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9. Id.
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individualization of workers. The implicit cross-subsidy of this
new regime further blurred the distinction between the nondis-
crimination principle and affirmative action.
This backdoor rise of affirmative action was, as I mentioned
before, an outgrowth of the keen disappointment of the level of
social progress that had taken place under the 1964 Act. I can
remember the public uneasiness when I attended Yale Law
School from 1966 to 1968, which intensified in my first four
years of teaching at the University of Southern California from
1968 to 1972. The early hope that equal opportunity would lead
to equal wages and advancement rapidly faded. With the early
disappointment came the suspicion that hidden but entrenched
practices of discrimination were the source of the difficulty, and
these would have to be rooted out with aggressive legal enforce-
ment that looked less to the niceties of intention and more to
the potent consequences of current practices. Because the origi-
nal game plan did not work out as expected, the outcomes did
not have to be accepted as fair simply because we thought the
process was fair. Rather the argument went in reverse: the pro-
cess could not be fair because the outcomes were so disparate
and unfair. Hubert Humphrey in 1964 might have been pre-
pared to live with bad outcomes in the absence of specific proof
of discrimination, but the next generation was not. By the be-
ginning of the 1970s, the debate switched to the explicit need
for affirmative action. No one was quite prepared to say that it
was a permanent condition. But many thought that the racial
ills in our society were so deep that strong social medicine
would be needed for a long period of time.
VII. SEARCH AND OUTREACH
One response to the new wave was to seek some way to
trim our sails within the broad framework of the anti-
discrimination norm. One approach suggests that it might be
possible to retain uniform hiring standards, but to require an
aggressive search and outreach to bring in black applicants. The
employer can advertise in the right newspapers, and make clear
the willingness to consider minority candidates who do not have
connections through the old-boy, white network. Bring more in-
dividuals into the funnel, and the conscientious employer will be
able to find black candidates to balance his racial portfolio, not-
withstanding the evident disparities in the overall social picture.
19981 513
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Many people have defended this argument as an inexpen-
sive way to skirt full-fledged affirmative action. The outreach
program does not force the employer to change its ultimate
standards; the employer is just required to make a very strong
effort to broaden .the applicant pool. Certain groups like the
Anti-Defamation League have been hostile to affirmative action,
but quite sympathetic to this compromise approach.
I take a dim view of this strategy, at least as it applies to
my own profession. Let me explain its potential sources of mis-
chief. Put aside the question of race, and ask how a conscien-
tious' employer should run a job search in my own profession,
and, I suspect, in others. What attributes make a candidate a
prime employment prospect? One key quality in a job applicant
is not only his ability to discharge immediate demands, but also
to grow in ability over time. Motivation and initiative are key
commodities for success. The people who embody these qualities
are those who come knocking on the door, begging to get in.
People with a passion for their work offer better prospects than
candidates that an employer must pry out of their present posi-
tions with a pitchfork. In the simplest terms, the people who ag-
gressively pursue .the jobs are the ones the employer wants to
hire. The employer that engages in extensive recruitment out-
reach will pull many candidates who do not pass that motiva-
tional threshold into the system. The advantages of the informal
sorting mechanism are lost, and much time has to be spent por-
ing over weak candidates, taking away the time that could be
spent in wooing candidates whose prospects are far brighter, or
in releasing time for other activities. In the end, you could have
(even in the all-white workforce) a very different group of
employees.
The costs of this approach cascade over time. The first
group of employees will not retain their positions forever, but
will be promoted over time. I think that there is some implied
business covenant to base promotion on the same standards
used to assess new hires. If this is true, then over time the met-
tle of the organization will change as new personalities rise to
the top. The changes in firm culture could be quite substantial,
and these changes will, in turn, influence the next set of hires
that the firm makes.
Of course, consistent with the basic approach, the top firm
managers could try to hold the line. Under this approach, inter-
[Vol. 43514
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nal promotions are judged by the same standards that applied
before the new recruits were hired. But I do not think it will be
possible to hold fast to these dual expectations over time. Out-
reach and recruitment do not stop with the initial hiring. They
create a set of expectations that help determine how people are
treated once they are hired. In my view, the costs of the broad
outreach proposals are quite high, and do not disappear simply
because they are used to finesse the line between nondiscrimi-
nation and affirmative action. The deviation from the older
standard is not as minimal as its proponents claim.
VIII. REMEDIATION OF PAST WRONGS
The second breach in the wall between the anti-discrimina-
tion norm and affirmative action comes from our altered re-
sponses to the transition question. In the early days, the law
took a very cavalier view towards transitions: any disadvantages
that people had before the 1964 Act remained thereafter. But
once this approach is rejected, it becomes permissible to ask
what offsets should be given today for the injustices that took
place before the 1964 Act. The lingering vestiges of past discrim-
ination become the spur to and justification for direct govern-
ment action. And if it takes affirmative action to attack these
vestiges, then so be it.
Once these race conscious remedies become permissible,
how broadly do they operate? To a naive tort professor like my-
self, the connection between wrong and remedy should be very
tight. If I punch you in the nose and you sue me for the nose-
bleed, the direct connection between my act and your harm re-
quires no extended commentary: hundreds of years of vi et
armis do the job. When the discourse shifts to lingering effects,
the sense of remediation expands. No longer is it necessary to
give relief only to the victim, and only against the wrongdoer.
Now the net can be spread much wider.
The consequences of this view are made most evident in the
discrimination cases that are brought not in employment, but in
education. Missouri v. Jenkins'° is a nominal desegregation case
10. 515 US. 70 (1995). For those interested in a partial pedigree, see Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 US. 33 (1990);' Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 US. 274 (1989). Shepard's lists five
decisions from the District Court and Eighth Circuit, starting from 1984. For my views,
see Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or School Desegrega-
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that has kicked around in the judicial system since 1977 in its
fruitless effort to isolate the lingering effects of pre-1954 dis-
crimination in the Kansas City School system. But what form of
intelligent remedy can we impose in 1998 when the population
of aggrieved students has long since left the system, and the
population that is taxed arrived on the scene after any original
wrong was long since concluded? The permanence of a city name
should not be allowed to conceal the shifting populations who
live there. These cases bear no connection to the process of indi-
vidual rectification of individual wrongs. Instead, they are a
form of social engineering that diverts social energies from the
task of improving education overall.
The ceaseless quest for remote remediation is, ironically,
freighted with present dangers, even when an astute court seeks
to apply the remedy only against entities that engaged in past
discrimination against discrete victims. Thus, suppose the cur-
rent town council wants to run an affirmative action program
for minority contractors. If the law holds that this program is
permissible only if the town has engaged in past discrimination,
then the present council has a powerful incentive to ransack the
past to establish the malfeasance of prior councils in order to
preserve its own freedom of action. So let us open old wounds
and exhume dusty records to show, in the light of hindsight,
patterns of racial discrimination that may never have existed at
all. In reopening the past, one can easily rekindle ancient
grudges and resentments that should have long been put to rest.
The 1964 promoters of the spirit of civil rights legislation
thought that gradualism would inexorably wean us from the
past. The newer vision repeatedly jumps back in time to pave
the way for future race-conscious actions. Perhaps we should
have affirmative action. But do we need to defame the dead to
do it?
The concerted effort to ferret out past discrimination also
turns on what entity engaged in racial discrimination. In Hop-
wood v. Texas,11 the University of Texas' Law School sought to
maintain its affirmative action program by showing that it was
guilty of past discrimination. Its own discrimination was notori-
ous, insofar as it tried in the years before Brown v. Board of Ed-
tion in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1101 (1996).
It. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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ucation'2 to set up an "equal" law school for the black candidates
that it tried to exclude from its own ranks - a ploy that the
United States Supreme Court rightly slapped down. 13 But these
earlier sins had been cured by the law school's strong affirmna-
tive action programs that had been in place for at least a gener-
ation. Past remediation as of 1996 did not look very promising
when confined to the law school. 14 To broaden the inquiry, the
Texas Law School assumed responsibility for the lingering ef-
fects of discrimination anywhere inside the Texas educational
system, from elementary school on up, both before and after
Brown was decided. 15 But the eagerness to embrace guilt should
be rejected; the law school had to be told that it could be ac-
countable only for its sins, not for misdeeds in Brownsville and
El Paso.16
In any event, with time, past discrimination becomes an
ever-weakening justification for affirmative action. Sitting on
our pre-millennium perch, a couple of dates stand out. Plessy v.
Ferguson was decided in 1896.17 Brown v. Board of Education
was decided in 1954.18 Thus, the period in which "separate but
equal" held unquestioned hegemony lasted for at most fifty-eight
years. Brown was decided forty-four years ago. We are almost at
parity in periods of control. But in terms of influence on present
policies, the most recent forty-four years should count for more
than the previous fifty-eight. And the ratios and the influence
will be still more dramatic in ten years time. Pegging affirma-
tive action therefore to the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion is tying one's hope to a wasting asset. You can make the
case only by insisting that so long as some lingering effects are
detectable, we shall always deem them sufficient. But at this
point, the argument is an open fiction that judges will not em-
brace and a badly divided public will not tolerate. After all,
would we blame most of the problems of race on the three-fifths
clause 9 of the original Constitution, even though it was abro-
gated by the Civil War?
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US. 629 (1950).
14. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 951.
15. Id. at 948.
16. Id. at 951.
17. 163 US. 537 (1896).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (repealed 1868).
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DL DIVERSIFICATION AND DIVERSITY
As past wrongs offer an ever-weakening justification for ex-
tensive affirmative action programs, the modern tendency
stresses the future benefits that derive from affirmative action.
Rectification thus yields to diversity as the theme around which
to rally the forces of affirmative action. But the shift in focus
opens up new challenges: what does diversity mean and how
does it operate? To some extent, diversity resonates with schol-
ars like myself who incline toward market solutions. In financial
markets, diversification of a stock portfolio reduces risk. In po-
litical settings, a wise firm acquires assets in many states to di-
versify against sovereign risk, be it by regulation or confiscation.
In both cases, the basic idea is the same: if you cannot predict
the future with certainty, do not place all your eggs in one bas-
ket. Diversity decentralizes investments by spreading them
hither and yonder. By investing in different corporations, and
indeed different mutual funds, you place your financial and po-
litical well-being in the hands of many individuals; all of whom
can hurt you, but none of whom can strangle you. I subscribe to
this form of diversity as a fully informed investor, even though I
have absolutely no idea what stocks I own, or why I have pur-
chased them. Diversity offers a rational response to necessary
ignorance.
How does this conception of diversity carry over from finan-
cial and political markets to the academic world or business in
general? Let me start in the law school world. If diversity is the
institutional imperative, then it becomes critical for each of this
nation's two hundred or so law schools to follow its own inde-
pendent course of action. Some schools will accordingly reach for
national markets; others will seek to fill local niches. Some
schools will have religious ties and affiliations; others will try to
be all things to all people. Still others will lack the resources or
inclination to take on the world. Some will specialize in high-
minded legal theory; others will see their salvation in business,
clinical practice, or international relations. Some schools could
specialize in issues of race and gender. There will be night
schools, and premier research institutions. Individuals can,
therefore, try to match their talents, abilities, and inclinations
with a wide array of institutions. Faculties and students will
seek favorable alignments and alliances. The mistakes that are
made by one will not infect others. Successful strategies will be
518 [Vol. 43
HeinOnline  -- 43 Loy. L. Rev. 518 1997-1998
Affirmative Action
imitated, after making appropriate adjustments for local condi-
tions. Trial and error will lead to constant experimentation and
improvement.
The task of assembling a faculty or any other kind of team
is especially difficult because it requires the pieces to mesh. And
getting them to mesh could require a form of diversity, but not
that type of diversity prized in today's discussions of the topic.
To see the problem, let me return again to my own profession.
The first job of any institution is to decide what people to bring
in and what people to keep out. That judgment requires judg-
ments to be made about people, and these often require parti-
tioning the evaluation into two halves. The first half tries to
measure some intrinsic characteristics of the potential candi-
date: the candidate's education and skill, speed at learning new
tasks, subject matter specializations, and so on.
But no school builds a great organization simply by hiring
people with great intellectual abilities. To make a great institu-
tion, people have to cohere; they have to be sensitive to team
dynamics; they have to interact on a wide range of administra-
tive and intellectual tasks. The law school that admits students
solely on boards and grades may be making a grave mistake.
The law school that hires faculties only on the strength of aca-
demic distinction and publications makes the same mistake, and
here is the rub - or so someone could argue. Athletic coaches
are always worried about fit and coordination. The good basket-
ball team needs to build morale, and will not start its five best
players if all of them play center. You need to fill each position
with a person who brings just the right skills. The same holds
true for academic institutions - or so someone could argue.
Others might disagree, and say, hire the strongest people and
then figure out how to harness their energies after they are in
tow.
Alas, it is precisely because you can argue for or against all
these sensible propositions that different institutions must be
allowed to go their separate ways. The same argument could
take place on affirmative action. Those institutions that want af-
firmative action can adopt it in whatever proportions they so
choose. Those that do not adopt affirmative action can follow
some other course. Yes, those who want to resegregate can do so
as well, if they can find students and faculty and funding to go
at it alone.
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My libertarian instincts play well with the view of diversity
that leads to a decentralization of institutional authority. The
standard understanding of diversity, such as that championed
by the American Association of Law Schools, cuts sharply in the
opposite direction. Now, diversity no longer describes the per-
mitted variations between institutions. Rather, it describes the
one indispensable characteristic that all institutions must have:
its required mix along lines of race and sex. Diversity ceases to
be an option and has become a command. It ceases to become an
agent for differentiation and has become a tool for conformity. It
ceases to become the rallying cry for competition and has be-
come an expression of the state monopoly control that is en-
forced by accreditation agencies, by the United States govern-
ment, and by various state commissions. It stems from the belief
that complex social problems have only one right answer and
that answer is known by people in positions of public power.
So today we invite the ultimate paradox. In the name of di-
versity we face the risk of the most monolithic system of hiring
imaginable. We allow a centralized elite to set standards that
bind us all. Some might say that the elite is democratically
elected, but this issue is of no moment. The prior question is not
whether democratic processes should control, but whose
processes should be in control. Let there be a strong consensus
on the need for a given course of action, and all the more reason
why the outlier should be allowed to go its own way - to chal-
lenge the received orthodoxy by example. The new system uses
voting processes to cut off the competition. The concentration of
political power now leads to a lack of diversification in, of
course, the name of diversity.
I believe that we pay a high price for this new form of uni-
formity. It is not because I wish my views on affirmative action
to govern the behavior of other institutions. I disclaim all such
ambitions. But while I have no desire of conquest, I do have
desires for territorial defense: I hope that my home institution
can grope its own solution to the affirmative action question in
ways that satisfy its diverse set of internal constituencies. I am
confident that we can do a better job if we do not have to face
constant scrutiny from outsiders with vast power, but limited
knowledge of our internal conditions.
Decentralization is the right way to proceed precisely be-
cause no one has certain knowledge as to the right answers; in-
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deed no one knows whether there is one right answer that fits
all institutions within a given class. Jim Crow worked so much
of its damage because racial prejudice was institutionalized by
state power. The last part of this sentence matters. It is one
thing to remove Jim Crow root and branch; it is quite another to
impose a new color-blind regime in its place. The moral differ-
ences between the aspirations of those two systems seem evi-
dent enough to me.
The key mistake of the 1964 Act was to assume that some
collective moral vision justified a uniform legal standard - one
which did not survive unchallenged for more than a couple of
years after it was frozen into law. Whether one wants or opposes
a color-blind norm is neither here nor there. The recipe for so-
cial disaster comes from having the state impose its norm on
private institutions that see fit to march down other paths. The
tragedy of the modem civil rights movement is its excessive reli-
ance on state coercion to achieve its moral objectives.
X. AT LAST THE FUTURE
So where do these ruminations lead me? I can give you
some flavor of my uneasiness by commenting on the California
Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 209, which has just been up-
held in the Ninth Circuit.20 On this measure, I will claim the
following dual distinction. First, I helped the groups and indi-
viduals who drafted the initiative. Second, I am far from sure as
a matter of first principle, that I would have voted for a mea-
sure that after a fashion I helped to draft.
Let me indicate the source of my ambivalence, or, as the
less charitable might say, my evasive inconsistency. I begin with
first principles. As head of any state institution of higher educa-
tion, my first objective would be to privatize all the universities.
State run universities, including the superb institutions in the
20. Its key command reads: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnic-
ity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). The initiative appeared on the ballot as Proposi-
tion 209. Coalition for Econ. Equit v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
cert. denied, 1997 WL 589411. The operation of the statute was initially stayed in the
district court, Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.Supp. 1520, 1520-21, and the
stay was dissolved and the motion denied in Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
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California system, set up a dangerous dynamic even though dif-
ferent state systems are in vigorous competition with one an-
other over faculty. One reason for this is that legislation and di-
rect supervision, enforced by the power over the budget, can
allow political forces to compromise both institutional and intel-
lectual independence. That risk is present in both California and
Texas where affirmative action programs are under siege in very
different ways. Internally governed institutions, in contrast, are
capable of incremental shifts in policy. What is striking about
the California and Texas situations is the rapid about-face im-
posed on these institutions from the outside, over the objections
of those who actually run them. That slippage from public com-
mand to internal operation promises a form of long-term guer-
rilla warfare from which no one can profit. The top-down com-
mand does not have internal legitimacy.
The second inherent danger of state universities is that
they create too many hidden subsidies for students in their be-
low-market tuition rates. I have no question that subsidies are
very much a part of how the best private universities operate,
and their mere presence in state institutions cannot be a source
of rebuke. The key doubts go to the pattern of the distribution of
these subsidies. It is surely acceptable to give support to stu-
dents with the strongest academic credentials, which is what
many private institutions do. However, it is far less clear that
this financial support should come from general tax revenues,
much of which are collected from lower income families whose
children cannot meet the academic standards needed to collect
these plum scholarships and grants. But in light of the massive
shifts in enrollment in the Texas and Berkeley Law Schools, it
becomes necessary to ask: "What is the wisdom in having black
and Hispanic families pay tax subsidies to upper-middle class
children of European and Asian origins?" Yet precisely that dis-
tribution arises when color-blind norms determine who gets into
state institutions at tuition rates far below either cost or market
rate. Would any one favor this distribution of subsidies in a pri-
vate institution that charges market-level tuition to its stu-
dents? I doubt it.
But suppose that we cannot privatize state institutions.
Then perhaps we can raise overall tuition levels to equal market
rates, and thereafter run a separate scholarship program that
gives direct aid to needy students who can spend it where they
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please under a voucher program at the university level. Vouch-
ers based on need are a sensible form of price discrimination
that has some strong positive side effects. Now that the subsi-
dies are distributed in a more rational fashion, the program is
in a better position to respond to the criticisms of the affirma-
tive action supporters.
Unfortunately, the in-state political pressures to keep
across-the-board tuition low are manifest, so that we are forced
to take public institutions as they are, and not as they ought to
be. In this context, Proposition 209 presents the conscientious
voter on affirmative action with this unhappy dilemma: either
you have too much or too little. Too much affirmative action
comes from the powerful ability of political groups to push their
programs to the limit once they obtain ground level control: de-
mands are made that Hispanics can teach Spanish; only blacks
can teach black study programs, or so the stories run. The chan-
cellors, deans, and faculty all line up four-square behind the
program without acknowledging or correcting any of its alleged
excesses, at least to the satisfaction of the most vocal critics.
In the face of this chorus of support for affirmative action,
the opposition becomes so suspicious of the status quo that it in-
sists on cutting out all preferences root and branch. After all, if
you cannot monitor and control daily excesses, then affirmative
action ends altogether. Lost in the middle are those citizens who
think that some modest affirmative action program, for
whatever reason, is better than no program at all, and also bet-
ter than the extensive set of preferences now in place. But in
the referendum election, the massive middle is forced to go to
one extreme or another, especially after the opponents of Pro-
position 209 adopt a hard-line defense of the status quo. By not
taking the bland Clinton view, "mend it, don't end it," Proposi-
tion 209. opponents further polarized the political community
and drove just enough voters from the moderate middle to the
color-blind end of the spectrum. It is a classic illustration of how
public deliberation can backfire: the ballot options nowhere re-
flect the preferred choice of a substantial fraction located smack
in the middle of a fractured political community.. The great
strength of private institutions is their ability to make incre-
mental adjustments without the discontinuities found in Texas
and California. To this day, I do not know how I would have re-
sponded if I had been asked to vote in the California election,
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but I suspect that the more strident the opposition to Proposi-
tion 209, the more likely it is that I would have voted for it.
This failure of the referendum process thus brings us back
to my title. Now that we have more state institutions of higher
education, we have fewer options on affirmative action. The ju-
dicial approach in Texas and the political approach in California
shows how high-principled debates on the affirmative action
preclude untidy but workable solutions. The reason affirmative
action will be with us for the next millennium is not because we
are unable to deal with questions of race. Successful low-level
accommodations take place every day. Rather, the reason we
will struggle with this issue is because both left and right suffer
from the collective mindset that important social issues require
government solutions that operate on a one-size-fits-all basis. In
this sprawling country, with its diverse population, that solution
will not work. We have to lower the level of decision-making
body to lower the volume of dispute. The problems that look in-
tractable on the wholesale level may admit of some grudging
progress on the retail level. To repeat, the great mistake of the
1964 Act lay not in its moral condemnation of Jim Crow, but in
its failure to respect the distinction between public and private
spheres. Unless we somehow reverse that trend, collective delib-
eration will never solve the affirmative action problem in the
next millennium no matter how hard we try. So long as the
foundations of our public policy are insecure, its superstructure
will continue to twist and wave in the wind.
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